Government programs often fail because administrative actors receive insufficient financial and personnel resources for their implementation. Despite the importance of resource provision for policy implementation, we know very little about when and why implementers are equipped with the resources they need. This paper examines the conditions under which new policies go hand in hand with resource increases for the administration. It matches data on policy adoptions and budgetary changes in the area of social policy for 15 European countries over 30 years (1990 to 2020). The analysis reveals that governments tend to provide more financial resources when (1) an issue is prominently discussed among parties, and when (2) institutional fragmentation is low. Moreover, governments provide fewer additional resources for policy implementation (3) when their chances of getting re-elected are low due to intense political competition. These findings contribute to our broader understanding of democracy and public administration, particularly regarding the link between public opinion and policy. The analysis presented here highlights and helps explain the phenomenon of “empty” responsiveness, where politicians adopt public policies in response to political demands, but these policies fail to make the promised impact due to insufficient resources for implementation.
The online appendix contains an extension of the procedures and results presented in the paper
The full replication material (110 Mb.) comprises the full report, the datasets, and the individul scripts. A README file is included, which explains its contents in detail.